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INTRODUCTION TO THE ARBITRATOR AS JUDGE… AND JUDGE OF JURISDICTION 
SYMPOSIUM 
By 
Thomas E. Carbonneau* 
 
 In the first several years of its institutional existence, the Yearbook on 
Arbitration and Mediation has produced comprehensive annual accounts of 
arbitration law. This year's symposium exceeds even the lofty standards of prior 
compilations. In addition to the Dean's generous funding, the student editors did a 
magnificent job of preparation and organization. Their undertakings were 
undergirded by the willingness of outstanding scholars to contribute to the 
endeavor. The authors are acknowledged leaders in the field of arbitration. Their 
articles are of exceptional quality; as Justice Benjamin Cardozo might have said, 
they "betoken" a rigorous and perspicacious analysis of contemporary 
developments in U.S. arbitration law. The articles are well-crafted, of substantial 
depth, and elegant; they educate and elucidate. Each one of them testifies to 
professional excellence. 
 The symposium originated in a time of anxiety and indeterminacy in the 
U.S. law of arbitration. The authors did not benefit from the return to the 
familiarity of supportive doctrine supplied by AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion.  
Every article, to some degree and in some fashion, addresses the reasoning and 
holding in the recent rulings of the oracle of U.S. arbitration law, the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds portended a reversal of judicial deference to 
arbitration and a return to a hostile supervisory posture on the basis of the integrity 
of law. A nineteenth century overhang seemed to be creeping into twenty-first 
century federal law. A Court that had recently, albeit unsuccessfully, invited lower 
courts to eliminate "manifest disregard" concluded that maritime arbitrators 
specifically authorized to rule by the parties and having conducted an extensive 
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hearing on the matter, exceeded their powers by rendering an award that lacked 
any legal basis. The determination not only announced a de facto reversal of the 
plurality holding in Bazzle, but also suggested that judicial review and legally 
correct results were now the applicable standard in vacatur proceedings. The 
subsequent ruling in Rent-A-Center v. Jackson seemed to confirm the substantial 
shift in the judicial role in policing arbitral awards under U.S. law. There, the 
Court carved out a judicial function in assessing the contractual validity of a 
"Kaplan delegation" of jurisdictional authority to the arbitrators to decide 
jurisdiction by creating a would-be second separability doctrine. Parties had the 
right to expand the adjudicatory authority of arbitrators, but the investiture needed, 
at least upon occasion, to be validated by a court of law. 
 As Professor Park aptly points out, the ruling in Stolt-Nielsen substantially 
undermines arbitral finality, an essential feature of an effective and useful arbitral 
process. As every modern law of arbitration indicates, the functionality of 
arbitration is reduced or eliminated by greater judicial presence in, and authority 
over, the arbitral process. Either the arbitral revolution was being quashed by a 
counter-revolution initiated by arbitration's principal proponent or Stolt-Nielsen 
and Rent-A-Center were, like Volt Information Sciences, Inc., a lapse, a momentary 
failure in the Court's sense of doctrinal direction. A great deal depended on the 
future course of the law, access to civil justice in the United States and the ability 
of international merchants to conduct global trade and commerce. It was as if 
arbitral autonomy and arbitrator sovereignty, propounded by Kaplan, Howsam, 
and Bazzle, had been discredited overnight and made subordinate to the dictates of 
substantive due process under law. It seemed as though the arbitration empire was 
in profound decline and collapsing. Judicially-acceptable results became the 
watchword of American arbitration law.  
 Some observers opined that the underlying motive for these atypical 
decisions resided with the Court's pro-business bias and its dislike of class 




economic efficiency. Class action waivers in arbitration contracts rid the system of 
these untoward restrictions. Eradicating class action was a necessary conclusion, 
no matter the short-term impact on arbitration. The leftist commentary decried the 
Court's suppression of legal rights for the consumer and the immunity afforded to 
business interests. A group of well-known and exhaustively analyzed cases 
addressed the issue of class action in arbitration. Bazzle centered upon the 
permissibility of class action in arbitration under the governing arbitral clause, as 
did Stolt-Nielsen and, a bit later, AT&T Mobilty. In the two latter cases, the Court 
at least acknowledged the class action dimension of the litigation by stating that 
bilateral class action or litigation was radically different from multilateral class 
action in terms of time, money, organization, and complexity. In all of these cases, 
however, the Court's holding essentially ignored class action and focused upon the 
power to regulate the arbitral process. First, arbitrators could interpret the content 
of arbitral clauses and determine their meaning and content in the same way they 
could construe the main contract. Second, however, the power of interpretation did 
not allow arbitrators to find content that simply was not there. They could not 
interpret when the arbitral agreement was silent on a particular matter: silence was 
silence. It did not become a whisper. The gap or omission of language was 
deafening. Arbitrators could not reinvent the protocol for a transaction. Third, state 
courts applying a hospitable state statute on arbitration could not elaborate 
decisional rules (on class action waiver) that "discriminated" against arbitral 
contracts as contracts. The rules' exclusive application to arbitration agreements 
rendered them illegal, although the courts were evaluating the contracts on their 
own unique terms. Federal preemption applied. In effect, the application and 
reaffirmation of federal preemption principles was an indirect means of restraining 
the impact of class action on civil litigation. 
 As Professor Park notes further, the recent cases have divided the Court 
along an ideological fault line. Previously, only Volt Information Sciences, Inc., 
among the forty-odd arbitration cases, had that impact upon the Court. Majorities 
YEARBOOK ON ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION 
 
50 
were generally neutral and somewhat larger, reflecting Court agreement on the 
utility and necessity of arbitration in the American legal process. Dissents were 
isolated and circumstantial, limited to addressing a particular juridical issue or 
interest. The Court's practice on arbitration had been forged over a half century and 
the essential percepts were firmly molded into law: privatization, contract freedom, 
federalization, wide arbitrability, and very extensive judicial deference. Politics 
and ideological convictions were largely absent from the discussions, reasoning, 
and the rulings. Indeed, it would be difficult to see Justice Breyer or Ginsburg, and 
former Justices Souter or Stevens as enemies of arbitration, despite their liberal 
leanings. At this stage, newly-appointed Justices Sotomayor and Kagan have not 
directly addressed the issue of arbitration. 
 The Court, however, grouped ideologically on the vexed question of class 
arbitration and class action waivers. The enforcement of suspect adhesive 
arbitration agreements is the most controversial question in modern American 
arbitration law. As Professors Schmitz and Stipanowich point out, it has brought 
another player, the U.S. Congress, to the decision-making stage on arbitration. 
Although its current appearance there seems more powerful and forceful (at least 
prior to the last mid-term elections), the Congress has voiced its opposition to the 
work of the Court on arbitration for some two decades. It was always a minority 
expression. It generally took the form of the Civil Right Protection Procedures Act. 
The effort to debase arbitration is rooted in a rights protection argument and now is 
described as the Fairness in Arbitration Act. The bill is an ideological 'shotgun" 
blast intended to decimate arbitration in disparate-party situations and corporate 
America's use of it in those circumstances. It proposes a radical reconstruction of 
arbitration's role in American society and reaffirms the hackneyed belief in the 
would-be protective virtues of adversarial litigation before courts. In the end, it is a 
misguided endeavor that denies American consumers and employees the benefit of 
economical, expert, and enforceable adjudication. 




content to the U.S. law of arbitration. It is unfortunate that the Court divided 
ideologically and could not surmount the differences in political allegiance. The 
law and society desperately need an example of a dialogue that can be productive 
and yield results for the larger public interest. The ideological encampment on the 
issue of class action waivers is unbending, partisan, and counterproductive. It 
allows both sides to be irresponsible and puerile, to sit on their respective stoops, 
hurl insults at each other, and describe their opponents as hateful and corrupt. It is 
a practice that has devastated Middle Eastern politics. As Professor Larson 
pointedly states, arbitration is, in the final analysis, here to stay. Budget shortfalls 
are so significant at both the state and federal levels that maintaining the present 
court system will itself be a very difficult challenge. Authorizing new courts to 
handle the volume of litigation is literally inconceivable. Therefore, rather than 
throwing insults or emasculating arbitration by poisonous legislative proposals, the 
goal should be to preserve the availability and effectiveness of arbitration while 
being vigilant about its procedural and contractual fairness. The authors of the 
symposium have done us the great service of preparing the necessary groundwork 
for this grand enterprise of reaching a workable solution. 
